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THE ASSERTION OF PERSONAL
JURISDICTION OVER JAPANESE
CORPORATIONS BY NEW YORK
COURTS
Peter Nadler & Ryan P. Parham
INTRODUCTION
Shortly after the end of the Second World War, Japanese
business and industry began a period of reconstruction and ex-
pansion that has produced one of the most powerful national
economies in the world.1 Japanese multinational corporations
have become some of the world's most influential and diverse
corporations and are rivaled in size only by the large American
conglomerates, which provided, in part, a pattern upon which
the post-war Japanese could build.2 As corporations have in-
creasingly expanded the manufacturing and marketing of their
products beyond national perimeters, courts have created the
means by which these corporations can be rendered amenable to
suit in the states where the corporations conduct their activi-
ties.3 Thus, the evolution of the rules of personal jurisdiction in
' At the conclusion of the Korean war, American policy focused on the development
of a strong, economically sound ally in the Pacific, setting the stage for Japan's spectacu-
lar growth of 10% per year from 1956 until the early 1970's. KANJI HAITANI, THE JAPA-
NESE ECONOMIC SYSTEM: AN INSTITUTIONAL OVERVIEW 7 (1976); EDWARD LINCOLN, JAPAN
FACING MATURITY 14 (1988). From 1967 onward, the country had a stable balance of
payments surplus. TAKAFUSA NAKAMURA, THE POSTWAR JAPANESE ECONOMY, ITS DEVELOP-
MENT AND STRUCTURE 102-03 (1980). By 1968, its gross national product was third only to
that of the United States and the Soviet Union. Id.
2 RICHARD T. PASCALE & ANTHONY G. ATHOS, THE ART OF JAPANESE MANAGEMENT 29,
34, 40, 45-46, 50 (1981); John B. Rhodes, The American Challenge Challenged, 47 HARV.
Bus. REV. 45 (Sept-Oct 1969).
1 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County, 480 U.S.
102 (1987) (Taiwanese manufacturer of motorcycle tubes brought indemnity action
against Japanese manufacturer of valve stems for tubes); Gulf Consol. Services, Inc. v.
Corinth Pipeworks, S.A., 898 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1990) (action commenced against Greek
oil field casing manufacturer because products failed to conform to warranted stan-
dards); Benitez-Allende v. Alcan Aluminio Do Brasil, S.A., 857 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.
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the United States has been influenced by the evolution of the
multiforum-multinational corporation."
In the last two decades, Japanese business and industry
have increasingly targeted and penetrated the lucrative Ameri-
can markets previously dominated by American and European
corporations.5 These inroads into American markets have pro-
duced a great deal of corporate litigation.' American plaintiffs
have expended great sums of money seeking to enforce rights
against Japanese corporations only to find that their defendants
were beyond the reach of state or federal courts. Conversely,
Japanese companies incorporated in Japan have been subjected
to expensive litigation based upon business relationships which
they considered entirely and exclusively pertaining to their do-
mestic forums.8
This article will examine the traditional and statutory bases
of obtaining personal jurisdiction in New York over foreign-
1988) (plaintiffs sued foreign manufacturer of pressure cooker for injuries sustained in
course of using latter's product); Robinson v. Audi Nsu Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft,
739 F.2d 1481 (10th Cir. 1984)(products liability action brought against importer and
manufacturer of automobile with defective gas tank design); Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji Co.,
Ltd., Osaka, 715 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1983)(longshoreman brought action against Japa-
nese manufacturer of defective wire-rope splice used to secure ship boom); Doula v.
United Technologies Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1377 (D. Minn. 1991)(plaintiffs, residents of
Republic of Cameroon, sued aircraft manufacturer in action arising out of aircraft explo-
sion, which occurred in Cameroon).
' See B. Glenn George, In Search of General Jurisdiction, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1097,
1100 (1990); R. Lawrence Dessem, Mr. Justice Potter Stewart: Personal Jurisdiction
After Asahi: The Other (International) Shoe Drops, 55 TENN. L. REV. 41, 43 (1987);
Note, Jurisdictional Fair Play and Foreign Defendants: Asahi Metal Industry Co. v.
Superior Court, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 629 (1986-87); Murray M. Weinstein, Note, Consti-
tutional Law: Conflict of Laws: Due Process in Judicial Proceedings: Jurisdiction Over
Non-Residents and Foreign Corporations, 18 CORNELL L. Q. 435-36 (1933).
Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Trade Friction with Japan and the American Policy Re-
sponse, 82 U. MICH. L. REV. 1648-49 (1984); see generally CLYDE V. PRESTOWITZ, JR.,
TRADING PLACES: How WE ALLOWED JAPAN TO TAKE THE LEAD 26-70 (1988).
' Prestowitz, supra note 5, at 55-61, 203-04. Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction over Do-
mestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 85, 116 (1983).
See, e.g., Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S.
102 (1986); Arrow Trading Co., Inc. v. Sanyei Corporation (Hong Kong) Ltd., 576 F.
Supp. 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
8 AKIO MORITA, EDWIN M. REINGOLD AND MrrsUKO SHIMOMURA, MADE IN JAPAN 174-
78 (1986); E. Charles Routh, Litigation Between Japanese and American Parties, in
CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN AND EAST AsIA 188 (John 0. Haley
ed., 1978).
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based Japanese corporations. The article traces the develop-
ment of the law of personal jurisdiction in New York from the
presence doctrine to the approach heralded by International
Shoe Co. v. Washington,"0 to wit, long-arm jurisdiction.
Part I of this article examines the "doing business" test of
section 301" of New 'York's Civil Procedure Law and Rules
9 The exercise of personal jurisdiction requires compliance with the due process
clause. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1941); DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRAC-
TICE 59 (1978). Under the due process clause, three requirements must be met before a
court may exercise jurisdiction: (1) notice, (2) opportunity to be heard and, (3) basis.
SIEGEL, supra at 59. This article will concentrate on the basis aspect of personal jurisdic-
tion. There will be no attempt to outline the principles of jurisdiction as they relate to
notice and opportunity to be heard, except indirectly, in that all three are met when a
defendant is served while physically present in New York. SIEGEL, supra at 60. See Burn-
ham v. Superior Court of Calif., Matin County, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (service on defendant
while temporarily in state does not offend due process). For a discussion of notice and
service of process, see SIEGEL. supra at 66-100; Survey of New York Practice, 55 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 560 (1981). For a dicussion of service of process under the Hague Conven-
tion on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Criminal
Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163, see Volkswa-
genwerk v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988) (service in United States on subsidiary of Ger-
man corporation as agent of parent corporation complied with Hague Convention);
Philip Knitting Mills v. Monarch Knitting Machinery Corp. 169 A.D.2d 603, 565
N.Y.S.2d 21 (1st Dep't 1991) (service on Japanese corporation by registered mail at its
principal place of business in Japan conformed with Hague Convention); Vasquez v.
Sund Emba, 152 A.D.2d 389, 548 N.Y.S.2d 728 (2d Dep't 1989) (personal service by
Swedish notary public of English language summons and complaint on managing direc-
tor of Swedish corporation in Sweden complied with Hague Convention); Rissew v.
Yamaha, 129 A.D.2d 94, 515 N.Y.S.2d 352 (4th Dep't 1987) (service on Japanese corpora-
tion by delivery of copy of summons and complaint to Secretary of State and by mailing
copy to corporation headquarters in Japan complied with Hague Convention); Reynolds
v. Koh, 109 A.D.2d 97, 490 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dep't 1987) (service by registered mail on
Japanese corporation and voluntary acceptance by Japanese corporation of mailed
amended summons and complaint did not comply with article 5(b) of Hague Conven-
tion). For commentary on service of process under the Hague Convention, see Comment,
How May I Serve You? Service of Process By Mail Under the Hague Convention 12
PACE L. REV. 177 (1992); Kenneth B. Reisenfeld, Service of United States Process
Abroad: A Practical Guide to Service Under the Hague Service Convention & Fed. R.
Civ. P., 24 INT'L LAW. 55 (1990). In order to further delineate the boundaries of this
article, the reader should be mindful of the fact that of the various forms of basis juris-
diction, this article will not cover in rem nor quasi in rem jurisdiction. For a comprehen-
sive treatment of the subject, see SIEGEL, supra at 118-126. For commentaries on the
subject see Michael B. Mushlin, The New Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction: New York's Revi-
val of a Doctrine Whose Time Has Passed, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 1059 (1989-90); Steven
Duke, Towards a Single Theory of State Court Jurisdiction?, 45 BROOK. L. REV. 863
(1979).
10 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
I N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 301 (McKinney 1990).
3
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(CPLR)-the equivalent of presence. Part II discusses the
"transacting business" test of section 30212 of the New York
long-arm statute. Part III discusses the factors relevant to an
assertion of personal jurisdiction over Japanese Corporations
through their American subsidiaries.
Part IV discusses five cases decided under the traditional
"doing business" test and the long-arm statute. The cases are
used to explore the issues of how the courts of New York state
have viewed Japanese corporate structure, how they have viewed
Japanese business activity, and how far the "long arm" of per-
sonal jurisdiction has been extended to reach Japanese
enterprises.
I. "DOING BUSINESS" IN NEW YORK, CPLR SECTION 301
The primary criterion used by the courts of New York to
determine whether a foreign corporation is amenable to suit in
New York is known as the "doing business test."'" This test is
codified in the CPLR at section 301, which states: "A court may
exercise such jurisdiction over persons, property, or status as
might have been exercised heretofore.' '
This section has been construed to mean that any defend-
ant over whom the courts of New York might have asserted ju-
risdiction prior to the enactment of the CPLR is subject to the
jurisdiction of the New York courts and may be served with pro-
cess even if that defendant is found outside the state.15 This sec-
tion is of particular importance for foreign corporations who
have contacts with the State of New York.
The focus of section 301 is upon those acts of persons which
constitute doing business. If a corporation is found to be doing
business in New York, it is subject to the jurisdiction of the New
York courts, regardless of its principal place of business, its
place of incorporation or the percentage of its business trans-
acted elsewhere.
The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that the de-
2 N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 302 (McKinney 1990).
" Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 415 (1917).
14 N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 301 (McKinney 1990).
' Joseph M. McLaughlin, Practice Commentary C 301:1, N.Y. CPLR § 301 (Mc-
Kinney 1990).
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fendant is doing business within the state.16 In addition, under
New York law, a defendant must be shown to be doing business
in New York when the action was commenced. 17
The courts of New York have formulated several criteria to
determine whether a foreign entity is doing business in New
York. This determination should above all be "simple [and]
pragmatic."'"
In applying this pragmatic test for section 301 jurisdiction,
the New York courts have, in a nutshell, focused on the follow-
ing facts: "the existence of an office in New York; the solicitation
of business in the state; the presence of bank accounts and other
property in the state; and the presence of employees of the for-
eign defendant in the state."' 9 The evolution of this pragmatic
test is described briefly below.
In Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co.,2 0 Justice Cardozo,
speaking for the New York State Court of Appeals, stated that a
defendant corporation must conduct activities with "a fair mea-
sure of permanence and continuity" within New York for it to
be found to be doing business in New York.2' Justice Cardozo
also emphasized that under the "doing business test," codified in
section 301 of the CPLR, the claim against a defendant need not
arise out of business done in New York.22
"6 Hoffritz For Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd. 763 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1985); see also
Marine Midland Bank v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1981). The plaintiff must
establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. However until an eviden-
tiary hearing is held, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing that jurisdiction
exists. Beacon Enterprises, Inc. v. Menzies, 715 F.2d 757, 768 (2d Cir. 1983).
"' Top Form Mills v. Sociedad Nationale Ind., 428 F. Supp. 1237, 1246 n.12
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (citing Gaboury v. Central Vermount Ry. Co., 250 N.Y. 233, 165 N.E.
275 (1929); Propulsion Systems v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 77 Misc. 2d 259, 260, 352
N.Y.S.2d 749, 751-52 (1973)).
18 Bryant v. Finnish National Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 432, 208 N.E.2d 439, 441, 260
N.Y.S.2d 625, 628 (1965). Since this article is primarily geared to provide guidance to
New York State legal practitioners, citation to all appropriate New York reporters is
given.
Is Hoffritz For Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., 763 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1985) (citations
omitted).
20 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
I1 Id. at 267, 115 N.E. at 917.
'z Id. at 268, 115 N.E. at 918. In discussing the "doing business" test, Justice Car-
dozo stated: "We hold further that the jurisdiction does not fail because the cause of
action sued upon has no relation in its origin to the business here transacted . . . . The
essential thing is that the corporation shall have come into the state." Id. at 268-69, 115
1992]
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The Court of Appeals in Sterling Novelty Corp. v. Frank &
Hirsch Distributing Co.23 described the activity necessary for
"doing business" as a "[c]ontinuity of action from a permanent
locale . "2. 4 Further, numerous New York courts have stated
that the activity must not be merely peripheral to the main bus-
iness of a foreign corporation but rather a substantial part
thereof.2"
The Court of Appeals has identified some in-state activities
of foreign corporations which, when aggregated, would constitute
"doing business" for jurisdictional purposes. For example, a
small office in New York which carries out minimal business ac-
tivities for a defendant foreign corporation has been held suffi-
cient to confer jurisdiction upon New York courts.26 In Bryant v.
Finnish Nat'l Airline, the court found determinative the facts
N.E. at 918.
Under the traditional power theory of jurisdiction, which rested on the sovereignty
of a state within its territory, a state could only exercise authority over persons present
within the state. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). Thus, service of process could
only be made on the defendant if he or she were physically present within the state. The
traditional power theory permitted service of process on a corporation's agents, because
it could be said that the corporation was present within the jurisdiction. International
Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914). Presence turned on the degree of busi-
ness the corporation conducted within the state: whether it was systematic and regular.
Tauza, supra at 266, 115 N.E. at 917.
The CPLR § 302(a) transaction-of-business test was developed to take advantage of
the minimum contacts theory of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945). Schroedoer v. Loomis, 46 Misc.2d 184, 259 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1965). For a discussion
of International Shoe and its progeny, see Authur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Traut-
man, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1121 (1966).
Although under the transacting business test plaintiff's claim must arise out of the trans-
action, the test requires considerably less contacts than those required under the § 301
doing business test. Nexsen v. Ira Haupt & Co., 44 Misc. 2d 629, 254 N.Y.S.2d 637
(1964).
2 299 N.Y. 208, 86 N.E.2d 564 (1949).
Id. at 210, 86 N.E.2d at 565.
26 See, e.g., Chaplin v. Selznick, 293 N.Y. 529, 536-38, 58 N.E.2d 719, 723 (1944);
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 119 N.Y.S.2d 729, 733 (1953).
26 15 N.Y.2d 426, 432, 208 N.E.2d 439, 441, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625, 629 (1965); see also
W. Lowenthal Co. v. Colonial Woolen Mills, Inc., 38 A.D.2d 775, 776, 327 N.Y.S.2d 899,
900-01 (3d Dep't 1972) (where defendant buys materials in New York and 85% to 90%
of its production was sold through New York parent, defendant was subject to New York
jurisdiction). But see Carbone v. Fort Erie Jockey Club, Ltd., 47 A.D.2d 337, 388-89, 366
N.Y.S.2d 485, 487 (1985) (where systematic solicitation of business and advertising in
New York was insufficient to subject Canadian corporation to New York jurisdiction in
personal injury action).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol4/iss1/12
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that the defendant had seven employees in New York, leased
office space in New York, had a bank account in New York, and
did public relations and publicity work in New York.
217
The rationale in Bryant was used by a trial court to subject
a Delaware corporation to New York jurisdiction where the "cu-
mulative significance of all these activities" in New York consti-
tuted doing business. ' Thus, a Delaware corporation, with na-
tional sales of almost $3,000,000 but total sales in New York of
only $250,000,9 was held to be within the jurisdiction of the
New York courts because it employed a single employee (whom
the court characterized as "a full time, high salaried em-
ployee")30 in New York on collateral business.3 " This employee
had (1) an office in New York; (2) a secretary; (3) a phone list-
ing; and (4) a checking account which listed the name of the
defendant corporation.2
In seeking to determine what constitutes doing business in
New York, the Court of Appeals in Miller v. Surf Properties3
held that "mere solicitation" of business in New York is not suf-
ficient to conclude that a non-resident corporation is doing busi-
ness in New York.34 However, solicitation in New York "'plus
some additional activities there'" may support a finding of do-
ing business.3 3 Judge Friendly explicated this "solicitation plus"
standard in Aquascutum of London, Inc. v. S.S. American
Champion,6 where he pointed out that the requisite "plus" in-
volved either "financial or commercial dealings in New York...
or the defendant's holding himself out as operating in New
York, either personally or through an agent."'37
A thorough survey of the development of the "solicitation
plus" rule is contained in Rolls-Royce Motors, Inc. v. Charles
27 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965).
28 Potter's Photographic Applications Co. v. Ealing Corp., 292 F. Supp. 92, 100
(E.D.N.Y. 1968).
29 Id. at 97.
30 Id. at 100.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 98.
33 4 N.Y.2d 475, 151 N.E.2d 874, 176 N.Y.S.2d 318 (1958).
" Id. at 480, 151 N.E.2d at 876, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
22 Id. (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 314, (1945)).
:6 426 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1970).
27 Id. at 212.
19921
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Schmitt & Co.3 8 In Schmitt, District Judge Leisure refused to
find jurisdiction under the "solicitation plus" rule because plain-
tiff failed to demonstrate both solicitation in New York and the
additional "pluses" needed to establish jurisdiction.3 9 Notwith-
standing plaintiff's assertions to the contrary, the court found
that although defendant made substantial purchases in New
York, it did not make regular sales there.4 ° The court explained
that although defendant advertised in New York newspapers,
those advertisements sought a national clientele.' The defend-
ant's alleged New York salesmen were in fact independent con-
tractors who worked for numerous other companies and who
bought cars for defendant rather than sold cars for it.42
A. Doing Business Through Subsidiaries
Many foreign corporations that seek to avoid being haled
into court in New York have wholly or substantially owned sub-
sidiaries which are incorporated in New York, or subsidiaries in-
corporated elsewhere that do business in New York. Much of the
case law in this area focuses on the business operations of the
subsidiary as a means of asserting jurisdiction over the parent
corporation.
In Taca International Airlines, S.A. v. Rolls-Royce of Eng-
land, Ltd.,4 3 the Court of Appeals held that the defendant Rolls-
Royce Ltd. ("Ltd.") was doing business in New York through its
subsidiary Rolls-Royce Inc. ("Inc.").4 4 The Court of Appeals'
holding was based on its findings that Ltd. had freely in-
terchanged employees with its subsidiary, Inc., all personnel of
Inc. were trained in England by Ltd., all the business operations
of Inc. were carried on the books of Ltd., Inc. and Ltd. had com-
mon directors, and Inc.'s sales literature was produced by Ltd."5
Based on these findings, the Court of Appeals concluded that
Ltd. "was doing extensive business in [New York] through its
'8 657 F. Supp. 1040, 1045-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
, Id. at 1050.
40 Id. at 1046.
41 Id. at 1047.
11 Id. at 1048-49.
4 15 N.Y.2d 97, 204 N.E.2d 329, 256 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1965).
" Id. at 102, 204 N.E.2d at 331, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 132.
46 Id. at 101-02, 204 N.E.2d at 330-31, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 131-32.
[Vol. 4:319
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local department separately incorporated as Inc.""
Carrying a subsidiary on the parent's books has been viewed
as a factor supporting jurisdiction by a New York court.47 In
Public Administrator of County of New York v. Royal Bank of
Canada," the Court of Appeals found that a subsidiary branch
of the bank that had been separately incorporated in France was
subject to suit in New York despite the parent corporation's at-
tempt to "treat its French branch as a separate entity.""' As in
Taca, 50 the parent corporation freely interchanged personnel
with the subsidiary branch, carried the branch's assets on the
parent's own books, recruited and trained all of the branch's
staff, and "merely notified [the branch] and [did] not consult
[the branch] on accounts which [were] transferred to it from
other Royal Bank branches . . . . "51 The subsidiary had been
separately incorporated, according to the court, for tax pur-
poses," and since it was in all things but name identical to its
parent, valid service upon the parent in New York conferred ju-
risdiction on the subsidiary.53
48 Id. at 102, 204 N.E.2d at 331, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 132.
" Public Administrator of County of New York v. Royal Bank of Canada, 19 N.Y.2d
127, 224 N.E.2d 877, 278 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1967).
48 Id.
I d. at 131-32, 224 N.E.2d at 879, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 381-82.
60 Taca Int'l Airlines, S.A. v. Rolls-Royce of England, Ltd., 15 N.Y.2d 97, 204
N.E.2d 329, 256 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1965).
Royal Bank, 19 N.Y.2d at 131-32, 224 N.E.2d at 879, 278 N.Y.S.2d 381-82.
82 Id. at 131, 224 N.E.2d at 879, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
82 Id. Accord Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 751 F.2d
117, 122 (2d Cir. 1984); Kossoff v. Samsung, 123 Misc. 2d 177, 178, 474 N.Y.S.2d 180, 183
(1984).
In Volkswagenwerk, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that New York courts have jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based on the presence
in New York of a wholly owned subsidiary. 751 F.2d at 122. First, the court found that
since Beech owned all the stock in the subsidiary, the requirement of common ownership
was satisfied. Id. at 120. Second, the subsidiary was completely dependent on Beech fi-
nancially. For example, Beech had made interest free loans to the subsidiary. Id. at 121.
Third, Beech exercised significant control over the selection and assignment of the sub-
sidiary's executive personnel, and Beech failed to observe corporate formalities. Id. Fi-
nally, the subsidiary only sold Beech Aircraft, and Beech tightly controlled its marketing
and operating policies. Id. at 122.
In Kossoff, the trial court asserted jurisdiction over a foreign multinational, Sam-
sung Korea. The court found that the Korean corporation was subject to New York juris-
diction based on service upon its New York subsidiary, Samsung America. 123 Misc.2d at
178, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 183. The court reasoned that the parent "retained complete control
over its wholly owned New York subsidiary," personnel were exchanged between the two
9
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The "mere department" theory of Taca54 and Royal Bank"
was refined by the Court of Appeals in Frummer v. Hilton Ho-
tels International, Inc.5" There, the Court of Appeals held that
Hilton Hotels (U.K.), a foreign corporation, was doing business
in New York through an agent because the agent "does all the
business which Hilton (U.K.) could do were it here by its own
officials. 5
7
In determining whether a subsidiary is a "mere depart-
ment" of its foreign parent, New York courts assess the follow-
ing factors: (1) the parent's ownership of the subsidiary; (2) the
subsidiary's financial dependence upon its parent; (3) the par-
ent's participation in personnel decisions of the subsidiary; (4)
the observance of corporate formalities between the parent and
subsidiary; and (5) the parent's control over the subsidiary's
marketing and operations. These factors were used by courts in
the cases discussed below.
In Furman v. General Dynamics Corp.,58 the subsidiary was
found to be doing its "own business" and thus the parent corpo-
ration was not subject to suit in New York." The court looked
to the fact that the companies had separate books and separate
product lines, and to the fact that the subsidiary was acquired
and not created.60 The subsidiary was found to be "a separate
corporation, not a mere department of [the parent corpora-
tion]"6  as had been the case in Taca 2
In Katz Agency, Inc. v. Evening News Association and
KTVY, Inc.,6 3 the court, in determining whether a subsidiary's
in-state activities could establish New York jurisdiction over its
parent, went through a two-tiered analysis. In this case, the non-
companies, the earnings of the subsidiary were reflected in the parent's financial state-
ment, and certain management decisions of the subsidiary were made by the parent. Id.
at 178, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
15 N.Y.2d 97, 102, 204 N.E.2d 329, 331, 256 N.Y.S.2d 129, 132 (1965).
19 N.Y.2d 127, 131, 224 N.E.2d 877, 879, 272 N.Y.S.2d 378, 382 (1967).
19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923
(1967).
" Id. at 537, 227 N.E.2d at 854, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
" 377 F. Supp. 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
11 Id. at 42.
60 Id.
61 Id.
8- 15 N.Y.2d 97, 204 N.E.2d 329, 256 N.Y.S.2d 129.
" 514 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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resident parent, Evening News, wholly owned a subsidiary,
KTVY, Inc., which operated television station KTVY in
Oklahoma." Katz, a New York advertising agency, sued KTVY,
Inc., and Evening News for breach of their advertising con-
tract. 5 Katz had solicited advertisements for KTVY in New
York and billed and collected the advertisers' accounts with
KTVY.6
First, the court determined that the subsidiary, KTVY, was
doing business under section 301 because of systematic and sub-
stantial solicitation. 7 In addition Katz's solicitation of business
in New York generated substantial revenues for KTVY.6 8 Fur-
thermore, although KTVY officials visited New York relatively
infrequently, the nature and quality of the meetings were vital
to KTVY's sales and business relationships. 9
Second, the court asserted that KTVY's parent corporation,
Evening News, was doing business in New York through
KTVY.70 "Where a wholly-owned subsidiary is present in New
York, a New York court may exercise personal jurisdiction over
the parent if the latter's 'control over the subsidiary's activities
[is] so complete that the subsidiary is, in fact, merely a depart-
ment of the parent'."71 The court's finding that Evening News
controlled KTVY was supported mainly by the fact that plain-
tiff was terminated as subsidiary KTVY's advertising agent not
by KTVY, but by Evening News.72
When a foreign parent completely controls its subsidiary,
the Court of Appeals has not hesitated to subject the foreign
parent to New York jurisdiction.7 However, when the foreign
6 Id. at 424.
65 Id.
Id. at 425.
67 Id. at 428.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 428-29.
" Id. at 428 (citing Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk AG, of Wolfsberg, 29 N.Y.2d 426, 432,
278 N.E.2d 895, 897, 328 N.Y.S.2d 653, 657 (1972)); Public Administrator of County of
New York v. Royal Bank of Canada, 19 N.Y.2d 127, 224 N.E.2d 877, 278 N.Y.S.2d 378
(1967); Taca Int'l Airlines, S.A. v. Rolls-Royce of England, Ltd., 15 N.Y.2d 97, 204
N.E.2d 329, 256 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1965)).
" Id. at 428.
U Royal Bank, 19 N.Y.2d 127, 224 N.E.2d 877, 278 N.Y.S.2d 378; Taca, 15 N.Y.2d
97, 204 N.E.2d 329, 256 N.Y.S.2d 129.
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parent's only relation to New York is through wholesalers of its
products to whom it is related by contract, the Court of Appeals
has refused to exercise jurisdiction over the foreign parent. 4 In
Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk A.G. of Wolfsburg, the Court of Ap-
peals held that it did not have jurisdiction over a foreign parent
that did no business in New York and that did not control or
own the New York wholesalers of its products. 5 Defendant,
Volkswagenwerk (VWAG), was a German manufacturer of
automobiles.76 Neither VWAG nor its subsidiary Volkswagon of
America (VWoA), incorporated in New Jersey, had an office in
New York or was qualified to conduct business there. VWoA
contracted with independently-owned wholesale distributors op-
erating out of New York to sell VWAG's products. " The court
found that, unlike the parent corporations in Taca9 and Royal
Bank,80 the parent, VWAG, did not exert sufficient control over
VWoA and its independent franchise dealers for it to be said
that the New York distributor franchised by the subsidiary was
a mere department of the parent.81
The sharing of directors and officers by subsidiaries and
their parents has often been considered a strong indication of
control of the subsidiary by its parent.82 However, the Second
Department in Ioviero v. Ciga Hotels, Inc.,83 refused a plaintiff
discovery as to whether there was common management of two
separate and distinct corporate entities, stating:
Courts will only pierce the corporat[e] veil and hold two corpora-
tions to constitute a single unit, where one is so related to, or
organized, or controlled by, the other as to be its instrumentality
Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk A.G. of Wolfsburg, 29 N.Y.2d 426, 278 N.E.2d 895, 328
N.Y.S.2d 653 (1972).
Id. at 431-32, 278 N.E.2d at 897, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 656-57.
70 Id. at 430, 278 N.E.2d at 896, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
7 Id.
78 Id.
7. 15 N.Y.2d 97, 204 N.E.2d 329, 256 N.Y.S.2d 129.
80 19 N.Y.2d 127, 224 N.E.2d 877, 278 N.Y.S.2d 378.
81 Delagi, 29 N.Y.2d 426, 431-32, 278 N.E.2d 895, 897, 328 N.Y.S.2d 653, 656-57
(1972).
"' See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 751 F.2d
117, 121 (2d Cir. 1984); Taca Int'l Airlines, S.A. v. Rolls-Royce of England, Ltd., 15
N.Y.2d 97, 101, 204 N.E.2d 329, 330, 256 N.Y.S.2d 129, 131 (1965).
8 101 A.D.2d 852, 475 N.Y.S.2d 880 (2d Dep't 1984).
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or alter ego. The fact plaintiffs may discover that the two corpo-
rations have identical controlling shareholders, officers and direc-
tors does not, by itself, warrant disregarding the separate corpo-
rate entities.84
B. Doing Business Through Agents
The Frummer "doing all the business" test"5 has been a
controlling standard in the assertion of jurisdiction over foreign
corporations through the actions of agents."' For purposes of ju-
risdiction, the Court of Appeals stated that "[t]he 'presence' of
Hilton (U.K.) in New York . . . is established by the activities
conducted here on its behalf by its agent."8
In Central Gulf Lines Inc. v. Cooper/T. Smith, Stevedor-
ing,"s the defendant's only identifiable contacts with New York
were sporadic and informal "word of mouth" solicitations by a
retained consultant, which were not binding on the defendant.89
These factors, in conjunction with the absence of any evidence
that the defendant principal engaged in any other business or
financial dealings in New York, led the court to conclude that it
had no personal jurisdiction over the defendant.9 0 Authority of
the agent to bind the principal is thus a critical consideration.91
Id. 101 A.D.2d at 853, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
" Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d at 533, 537, 227 N.E.2d at 851,
854, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 41, 44, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967)("the service [i.e., the agent]
does all the business which Hilton (U.K.) could do were it here by its own officials.").
" See, e.g., Central Gulf Lines Inc. v. Cooper/T. Smith, Stevedoring, 664 F. Supp.
127, 129-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); I. Oliver Engebretson, Inc. v. Aruba Palm Beach Hotel and
Casino, 587 F. Supp. 844, 849-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
'7 Frummer, 19 N.Y.2d at 538, 227 N.E.2d at 854, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
8' 664 F. Supp. 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
89 Id. at 130.
90 Id. at 130-31. The court also noted that the defendant had no office, telephone,
property or employees in New York. Id. at 129.
" See Baird v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 883, 884-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(no jurisdiction over principal where agent was "devoid of authority to bind [principal]
in any way. [Agent] could solicit orders, but that is all it was empowered to do. It had no
power to confirm sales or to set price schedules, or terms or conditions of sales."). See
also Arbitron Co. v. E.W. Scripps, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 400, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (no juris-
diction based on agent's in-state activities because in-state advertising agency could not
confirm orders or guarantee payments. "Essentially, their activities are those of a deposi-
tor and transmitter of funds and not those of one actively engaged in financial or com-
mercial dealings."). But see Carter Wallace, Inc. v. Ever-Dry Corporation, 290 F. Supp.
735, 737-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (Tennessee corporation subject to New York jurisdiction
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The undisputed authority to bind the principal was the de-
ciding factor in I. Oliver Engebretson, Inc. v. Aruba Palm Beach
Hotel and Casino.2 District Judge Kram93 there stated: "I find
that the presence of an agent in New York with the undisputed
authority to bind the foreign principal by confirming reserva-
tions is sufficient to warrant a finding that the Aruba defendants
are 'doing business' in New York." 9"
In Miller v. Surf Properties,95 the court viewed the amount
of discretion or the exercise of judgment by the agent as mate-
rial to an analysis of personal jurisdiction.98 Consequently, the
court refused to subject a Florida hotel to New York jurisdiction
because its New York agent solicited but did not confirm
reservations.97
Finally, even if a third party were able to assert jurisdiction
over a foreign defendant based on the in-state activities of that
defendant agent, the agent itself may not use its own in-state
activities as a basis for asserting jurisdiction over its principal 9
In Pneuma-Flo Systems, Inc. v. Universal Machinery, the New
York sales representative of a California company, with no New
York contacts other than its retention of the sales representa-
tives, attempted to sue the California company in New York. 9
The court refused to find CPLR section 301 jurisdiction not only
because New York law had traditionally prohibited an in-state
agent from obtaining jurisdiction over a principal based on that
agent's own in-state activities but also because the agent was
wholly independent and was not controlled by defendant. 100
The factors New York courts have most frequently consid-
based on its sales representative's substantial activities in New York including sales so-
licitation, collection of delinquent accounts, authority to return merchandise without
principal's permission, and authority to conduct investigations of possible takeover
targets). See also Meat Systems Corp. v. Ben Langel-Mol, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 231, 233
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (agent's role as principal's exclusive "claims adjuster" in New York was
an important factor in holding Dutch company subject to New York jurisdiction).
9" 587 F. Supp. 844, 850 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
"' Id. at 846.
"4 Id. at 850.
4 N.Y.2d 475, 151 N.E.2d 874, 176 N.Y.S.2d 318 (1958).
Id. at 480-81, 151 N.E.2d at 876-77, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 321-22.
97 Id.
8 454 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
99 Pneuma-Flo Systems, Inc. v. Universal Machinery, id. at 861-62.
100 Id. at 865.
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ered to determine whether a foreign corporation is doing busi-
ness in New York are:
1. The presence of employees within the state;"0 l
2. The status of employees within the state;'
3. The presence of a bank account within the state;10
3
4. A telephone listing within the state; 04
5. Office space rented or owned within the state;'0 5
6. Taxes paid within the state; 0 6
7. The relative volume of business done within the state;
10 7
and
8. The nature and number of visits to the state.'0
101 Bryant v. Finnish National Airlines, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 429, 208 N.E.2d 439, 440, 260
N.Y.S.2d 625, 627 (1965); Laufer v. Ostrow, 55 N.Y.2d 305, 310, 434 N.E.2d 692, 695-96,
449 N.Y.S.2d 456, 459-60 (1982) (citing cases); Potter's Photographic Applications Co. v.
Ealing Corp., 292 F. Supp. 92 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
102 Potter's Photographic Applications Co. v. Ealing Corp., 292 F. Supp. 92
(E.D.N.Y. 1968).
103 Bryant v. Finnish National Air Lines, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 429, 208 N.E.2d 439, 441,
260 N.Y.S.2d 625, 627 (1965); Potter's Photographic Applications, 292 F. Supp. at 98.
104 Potter's Photographic Applications, 292 F. Supp. at 98; Vincent v. Davis-Gra-
bowski, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 430, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). But see J.E.T Advertising Associates
v. Lawn King, Inc., 84 A.D.2d 744, 744, 443 N.Y.S.2d 745, 747 (2d Dep't 1981) (mainte-
nance of New York telephone number is insufficient to render corporation subject to
New York jurisdiction when corporation is not authorized to do business in New York);
Carbone v. Fort Erie Jockey Club, 47 A.D.2d 337, 339, 366 N.Y.S.2d 485, 487 (4th Dep't
1975) (maintenance of New York telephone number is insufficient to confer jurisdiction
on New York courts).
105 Bryant, 15 N.Y.2d at 429, 208 N.E.2d at 440, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 626-27; Oral-B
Lab., Inc. v. Mi-Lor Corp., 611 F. Supp. 460, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Potter's Photographic
Applications, 292 F. Supp. at 97.
Nursery Plastics, Inc. v. Newton & Thompson, Inc., 191 N.Y.S.2d 655, 657 (1959)
(defendant was not engaged in business within the state because defendant sold its prod-
ucts in New York only on an occasional basis, paid no local taxes in New York and
maintained no sales offices within the state).
10' Laufer v. Ostrow, 55 N.Y.2d 305, 311-312, 434 N.E.2d
692, 695, 449 N.Y.S.2d 456, 459-60 (1982)("[t]he volume of business thus generated,
while not determinative, may have relevance."); Buckley v. Redi-Bott, Inc., 49 Misc.2d
864, 268 N.Y.S.2d 653, 657 (1966) (while not controlling, the total dollars volume of de-
fendant's business is a relevant factor in determining the courts jurisdiction). See also
Amalgamet Inc. v. Ledoux & Company, 645 F. Supp. 248, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Although
the percentage of defendant's gross income earned in New York ranged only from 0.95%
to 0.02%, since at least 33% of defendant's total revenues were from New York, defend-
ant obtained substantial benefit from its business in New York).
'08 Pneuma-Flo Systems, Inc. v. Universal Machinery, 454 F. Supp. 858, 861, 865
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); George Reiner & Co., Inc. v. Schwartz, 41 N.Y.2d 648, 650-54, 363
N.E.2d 551, 552-55, 344 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846-48 (1977).
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Under a subsidiary theory of doing business, the inquiry is
whether "the subsidiary does all the business which the [parent]
could do were [the parent] here by its own officials." ' The
courts will consider the following factors in addressing this issue:
1. The separateness of the books of parent and subsidiary;" 0
2. The authority exercised over the subsidiary by the
parent;'
3. The similarity of the product lines or services of subsidi-
ary and parent; 12
4. The hiring, training and interchanging of employees; 1 3
5. Common shareholders, directors and officers. 1 4
Under an agency theory of doing business the courts
consider:
1. The authority of the agent to bind the principal;" 5
2. The exclusivity of the agency relationship;1 6
3. The volume of business done by the agent for the princi-
pal;1 7 and
,09 Frummer v. Hilton Hotels International Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 537, 227 N.E.2d
851, 853, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, 44 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967); Arbitron Co. v.
E.W. Scripps, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 400, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
"0 Public Administrator of County of New York v. Royal Bank of Canada, 19
N.Y.2d 127, 131, 224 N.E.2d 877, 879, 278 N.Y.S.2d 378, 381 (1967); Taca Int'l Airlines,
S.A. v. Rolls-Royce of England, Ltd., 15 N.Y.2d 97, 101-02, 204 N.E.2d 329, 330-31, 256
N.Y.S.2d 129, 131-32 (1965).
.. Katz Agency, Inc. v. Evening News Ass'n and KTVY, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 423, 428-
29 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Beech Aircft. Corp., 751 F.2d
117, 120-22 (2d Cir. 1984).
"I Taca, 15 N.Y.2d at 100-01, 204 N.E.2d at 330-31, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 131.
... Royal Bank, 19 N.Y.2d at 132, 224 N.E.2d at 879, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 381-82. See
also Gonzales v. Amtek, Inc., 50 Misc.2d 62, 68, 269 N.Y.S.2d 616, 622 (1966) (secretary
acted on behalf of parent and subsidiary); Rabinowitz v. Kaiser-Frazer Corp., 198 Misc.
707, 711, 96 N.Y.S.2d 642, 645 (1950) (parent paid salaries of some common officers).
... Royal Bank, 19 N.Y.2d at 131, 224 N.E.2d at 879, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 381; Taca, 15
N.Y.2d at 100-01, 204 N.E.2d at 330, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 130-31.
", I. Oliver Engerbretson v. Aruba Palm Beach Hotel, 587 F. Supp. 844, 850
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Arbitron Co. v. E.W. Scripps, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 400, 403 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
"' Ackert v. Ausman, 218 N.Y.S.2d 822, 828, 29 Misc.2d 962, 247 N.Y.S.2d 999 (1st
Dep't 1964).
"' Ackert v. Ausman, 218 N.Y.S.2d 822, 29 Misc.2d 962, 247 N.Y.S.2d 999 (1st
Dep't 1964); Singer v. Walker, 32 Misc.2d 782, 784, 223 N.Y.S.2d 935, 938 (1962); Roch-
ester Happy House, Inc. v. Happy House Shops, Inc., 14 A.D.2d 491, 491, 217 N.Y.S.2d
791, 791 (4th Dep't 1961) (mem.).
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4. The solicitation of business by the agent for the
principal."'
II. "TRANSACTING BUSINESS" UNDER SECTION 302
CPLR section 302(a)(1)" 9 provides an independent basis on
which a New York plaintiff can assert personal jurisdiction over
a non-resident defendant found to be "transacting business" in
New York. The "transaction of business" analysis requires sig-
nificantly fewer contacts than those required under the "doing
business" test in New York.'2 °
Although the statute sets forth at least six bases upon which
a foreign resident can be made subject to the jurisdiction of New
York state courts, this paper discusses only that part of the stat-
ute which asserts jurisdiction based on the transaction of any
business in New York.
The focus of section 302 of the CPLR is upon a single or
limited business transaction as opposed to a "systematic and
continuous" business activity as required under the "doing busi-
ness" standard of section 301. Section 302, by its express terms,
requires the cause of action to arise out of the business trans-
acted within New York, whereas section 301 does not.
The evolution of the doctrine of personal jurisdiction, from
Pennoyer's'2' strict residence requirement, to International
Shoe's'2 2  "minimum contacts" standard, to Hanson v.
Denckla's s inquiry as to whether defendant has "purposefully
118 Laufer v. Ostrow, 55 N.Y.2d 305, 311, 434 N.E.2d 692, 698, 449 N.Y.S.2d 456, 462
(1982); Katz Agency, Inc. v. Evening News Association and KTVY, Inc., 514 F. Supp.
423, 428-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
11 Section 302 provides, in part:
Personal jurisdiction by acts of non-domiciliaries (a) Acts which are the basis of
jurisdiction.
As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a
court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his or her
administrator, who in person or through an agent: (1) transacts any business
within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. §302, PARA. (A)(1) (McKINNEY 1990).
1"0 Simonson v. International Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281, 285-86, 200 N.E.2d 427, 251
N.Y.S.2d 433, 436 (1964).
121 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
122 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
123 357 U.S. 235 (1953).
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avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State,"12 has had a substantial impact on the develop-
ment of CPLR section 302.
One of the landmark cases under section 302 is Longines-
Wittnauer Co. v. Barnes Reinecke.125 Judge Fuld's opinion con-
tained an extensive analysis of section 302. The Court of Ap-
peals concluded that Barnes & Reinecke Corporation, a Dela-
ware corporation with its principle place of business in Illinois,
was subject to the jurisdiction of the New York courts because it
engaged in numerous activities in New York, in connection with
a single business transaction.1 26 The activities included
substantial preliminary negotiations through high-level personnel
during a period of some two months; the actual execution of a
supplementary contract; the shipment for use here [in New
York], subject to acceptance following delivery, of two specially
designed machines, priced at the not inconsiderable sum of
$118,000; and the rendition of services over a period of some three
months by two of the appellant's top engineers in supervising the
installation and testing of the complex machines.
We need not determine whether any one of the foregoing ac-
tivities would in and of itself, suffice to meet the statutory stan-
dard; in combination they more than meet that standard. 1
27
Contacts by high level personnel was also a factor consid-
ered in Potter's Photographic Application Co. v. Ealing Corpo-
ration.1 28 The United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York applied its analysis of personal jurisdiction
based upon "doing business" and considered defendant's high
level contacts under the section 302 "transacting business" test.
The District Court held that the defendant was subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction in New York on the ground that "high-level
officials" of the defendant conducted substantial negotiations in
New York.129
The defendant's representatives visited New York at least
124 Id. at 253.
..5 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
121 Id. at 457-58, 209 N.E.2d at 75-76, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
527 Longines-Wittnauer Co. v. Barnes Reinecke, 15 N.Y.2d at 457-458, 209 N.E.2d at
75, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
"' 292 F. Supp. 92 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
129 Id. at 101.
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five times in order to consummate a distribution contract with
the plaintiff (whereby plaintiff would be the exclusive distribu-
tor of defendant's products in the metropolitan New York area),
and in order to secure the business of a large potential customer,
the New York City Board of Education.' s0 These negotiations
resulted in the shipment of over $10,000 worth of merchandise
into New York for resale to New York customers."3 ' The Court
continued that although the assignment to plaintiff of defend-
ant's sales contract with the Board of Education was concluded
in Massachusetts, and thus that maybe "where the seed ripened
into fruit, there can be no doubt that it was cultivated in New
York."'
In Pneuma-Flo Systems, Inc. v. Universal Machinery,
Corp.,'s' the Southern District elaborated on the analysis of vis-
its to the forum state as a factor in determining whether the
defendant was subject to the jurisdiction of New York courts.'
Although it described the types of in-state activities that would
subject a defendant to jurisdiction under the "transacting busi-
ness" test,135 the Southern District refused to extend personal
jurisdiction over a California corporation whose visits to New
York were not "essential to the ongoing relationship of the par-
ties" and were for the "benefit of plaintiff only."'3 6
A visit into the forum state for "further talks" at the plain-
tiffs office was not sufficient to subject the defendant to the ju-
risdiction of New York courts-in Presidential Realty Corpora-
tion v. Michael Square West, Ltd."3 7 The Court of Appeals held
that
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
113 454 F. Supp. 858.
134 Id.
31 Id. at 865-66.
136 Id. at 866. In so holding the court stated:
It is not the number of such incursions, or their duration, however, which is
dispositive; rather, it is their nature and quality. Thus, in each of the cases
where jurisdiction over a non-resident has been upheld due to the visits of
its officials, those meetings were for purposes essential to the formation or
continuance of the contracts which has given rise to the litigation.
Id. at 866.
"1 44 N.Y.2d 672, 376 N.E.2d 198, 405 N.Y.S.2d 37 (1978).
1992]
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This meeting allegedly resulted in conciliatory modifications in-
corporated into an agreement which the defendants' representa-
tive concededly signed .. . .Therefore on the record before us
there is no proof of any contacts with this State other than the
fact that the modification letter and the agreement were signed in
New York. This is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 138
In Hi Fashion Wigs, Inc. v. Peter Hammond Advertising,
Inc.,i s9 Schuminsky, the president of the plaintiff-corporation,
was impleaded as a third-party defendant on the grounds that
he had personally guaranteed all payments plaintiff owed the
defendant. 4 ' The plaintiff, Hi Fashion Wigs, sued the defendant
advertising company for fraudulent actions under the contract,
such as excessive billing and improper advertising.' 4" The court
found that the president's personal delivery of the signed instru-
ment of guarantee in New York was sufficient to justify haling
the president into New York even without further contacts.
4 2
The court reasoned that the president's delivery of guarantee
was "so essential .. .to [the contract's] validity and existence
. .. that Schuminsky must be deemed to have 'purposefully'
availed himself 'of the privilege of conducting activities within
[this] state', thereby 'invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws,.,,4
The volume of business done by the defendant in New York
may also be a factor considered pertinent by New York courts in
their CPLR section 302 analyses. In McKee Electronic Co., Inc.
v. Rauland Borg Corp.,"" the court found that the defendant
did less than five percent of its sales in New York, that all goods
were shipped FOB 45 Chicago and that all orders were placed by
mail to Chicago. Only then were the goods shipped to New
York. '4 The contacts there were found not to meet the Hanson
"I Id. at 673, 376 N.E.2d at 198, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 38 (citations omitted).
'39 32 N.Y.2d 583, 300 N.E.2d 421, 347 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1973).
140 Id. at 584, 300 N.E.2d at 421-22, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 48.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 586-87, 300 N.E.2d at 423, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 50.
141 Id. at 587, 300 N.E.2d at 423, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 50 (citations omitted).
14 McKee Electric Co., Inc. v. Rauland Borg Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 377, 229 N.E.2d 604,
283 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1967).
15 Free on Board. The term generally means that the seller assumes all responsibili-
ties and costs up to the point of delivery. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 665 (6th ed. 1990).
1"0 Id. at 379, 229 N.E.2d at 605, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 35.
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v. Denckla'47 minimum standard but, rather, were "infinitesi-
mal" and as such would not sustain jurisdictiori.145
SUMMARY OF TRANSACTING BUSINESS
Factors that New York courts examine to determine per-
sonal jurisdiction based upon transacting business in New York
are:
1. The status of personnel who make visits to New York and
the nature of those visits; 49
2. Whether or not substantial negotiations took place in
New York; 5 °
3. The volume of and/or dollar amount of business done in
New York by the defendant;16 ' and
4. Whether the goods were shipped FOB outside of New
York.' 2
III. JAPANESE CORPORATE STRUCTURE
Is it appropriate for a court to make some basic assump-
tions about Japanese corporations for the purpose of a jurisdic-
tional analysis? Do the courts in fact do this, treating Japanese
corporations differently than other foreign corporations? As set
forth herein, there exist certain prevalent ideas about Japanese
corporations. Japanese corporations are seen by many in the
United States as a potential threat to our security. Numerous
17 357 U.S. 235 (1953).
McKee, 20 N.Y.2d at 379-82, 229 N.E.2d at 604, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 37.
'49 Longines-Wittnauer Co. v. Barnes Reinecke, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 455, 209 N.E.2d 68,
75, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 19 (1965); Potter's Photographic Application Co. v. Ealing Corpora-
tion, 292 F. Supp. 92, 100-103 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Pneuma-Flo Systems, Inc. v. Universal
Machinery, 454 F. Supp. 858, 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
150 George Reiner & Co., Inc. v. Schwartz, 41 N.Y.2d 648, 653, 363 N.E.2d 551, 554,
394 N.Y.S.2d 844, 847-48 (1977); Longines-Wittnauer Co. v. Barnes Reinecke, 15 N.Y.2d
443, 455, 209 N.E.2d 68, 75, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 19 (1965). See also Presidential Realty Cor-
poration v. Michael Square West Ltd., 44 N.Y.2d 672, 673, 376 N.E.2d 198, 199, 405
N.Y.S.2d 37, 38 (1978)(mem.)(one day business meeting may supply minimum contacts).
'" Longines-Wittnauer Co. v. Barnes Reinecke, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 455, 209 N.E.2d 68,
75, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 19 (1965); Potter's Photographic Application Co. v. Ealing Corpora-
tion, 292 F. Supp. 92, 101 (1968); McKee Electric Co. v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 20 N.Y.2d
377, 379, 229 N.E.2d 604, 605, 283 N.Y.S.2d 34, 35 (1967).
,' See McKee Electric Co. v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 377, 379, 229 N.E.2d
604, 605, 283 N.Y.S.2d 34, 35 (1967)(court considered, inter alia, the Illinois defendant
shipped goods to New York FOB Chicago).
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texts address the subject. 15 Do these concerns affect the analy-
ses New York courts apply in determining whether Japanese
corporations are subject to jurisdiction in New York?
The organization of Japanese corporations has its greatest
impact on the personal jurisdiction analyses of CPLR sections
301 and 302 in the area of jurisdiction based upon the activities
of subsidiaries; that is, subsidiaries that are dominated by par-
ent corporations or are "mere departments" of their parent
corporations.1"4
A common perception of Japanese subsidiaries incorporated
in the United States is that they are dominated by their Japa-
nese parent corporations. "One of the commonly used control
mechanisms of the HQ [headquarters], however, is to give a sub-
sidiary substantial formal autonomy but to send competent ex-
patriates who will manage the subsidiary in accordance with the
HQ's wish without its direct intervention. 1' 55 But Takamiya
goes on to point out that "[t]he form of subsidiary acquisition is
known to have a substantial effect on the degree of subsidiary
autonomy. Head offices tend to exercise more influence on a sub-
sidiary which was built from scratch than on one purchased
from local corporations. "156
Takamiya's. research also indicates that there are pressures
on the parent corporation to maintain both centralized and de-
centralized management. 157 The former gives the subsidiary less
autonomy than the latter. Factors tending to encourage central-
ized control of subsidiaries include (1) an increasing need for co-
ordination within corporate groups to fend off competition"5
and (2) the need for global marketing and manufacturing strate-
153 See, e.g., LAWRENCE FRANKO, THE THREAT OF JAPANESE MULTINATIONALS, How
THE WEST CAN RESPOND (1983); CLYDE V. PRESTOWITZ, JR. TRADING PLACES: How WE
ALLOWED JAPAN To TAKE THE LEAD 20-21 (1988).
'" See Taca Int'l Airlines, S.A. v. Rolls-Royce of England, Ltd., 15 N.Y.2d 97, 204
N.E.2d 329, 256 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1965) (jurisdiction over a local subsidiary was established
based on the court's view that this subsidiary was not an independent corporation but
was completely dominated by its parent and was a "mere department" of the parent).
"' Makoto Takamiya, The Degree of Organizational Centralization in Multina-
tional Corporations, in JAPAN'S EMERGING MULTINATIONALS 35, 37 (Susumu Takamiya &
Keith Thurley eds., 1985).
1 Id. at 42 (citation omitted).
I7 d. at 47.
158 Id. at 38.
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gies to more efficiently allocate resources.1 59
Factors that cause pressure to decentralize include (1) the
cost of using expatriates to manage foreign subsidiaries,6 ° (2)
the increasing number of subsidiaries owned by Japanese mul-
tinationals,1 6 1 and (3) local pressures including legal conse-
quences (e.g., jurisdictional consequences) for failing to give
more autonomy to the subsidiary.'
62
Additional evidence which weighs against the generalization
that subsidiaries are somehow culturally submissive to their par-
ent corporations is the Japanese concept of ringi.'s3 The ringi
system of decision-making is a relic of feudal Japan where mid-
dle ranking officers were expected to make vital decisions so as
to shield their superiors from responsibility. 16"
One author suggests that the ringi influence in decision-
making still exists. 65 This indicates that middle managers, such
as those who typically lead subsidiaries, act with a considerable
amount of autonomy in making substantial decisions, and that
their seniors merely coordinate efforts to back them up.'66 This
view cuts against the generalization that Japanese subsidiaries
are parent-dominated, "mere department" subsidiaries.
Another author suggests that there is a conflict between the
basic management style of a corporation's headquarters and the
style of the host countries.' 7 He categorizes the resolution of
this conflict as a function of the evolution of the parent corpora-
tion and of the type of business in which the corporation is
engaged.' 8
Thus it would seem that any assumptions about the rela-
tionship between Japanese corporations and their American sub-
'19 Id. at 46.
160 Id. at 42.
161 Id. at 47.
162 Id.
163 KANJI HAITANI, THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC SYSTEM: AN INSTITUTIONAL OVERVIEW 89-
90 (1976).
'e NAOTO SASAKI, MANAGEMENT & INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE IN JAPAN 56 (1981).
168 Id. at 58.
,66 HAITANI, supra note 163, at 89.
... Noritake Kobayashi, The Patterns of Management Style Developing in Mul-
tinationals in the 1980's, in JAPAN'S EMERGING MULTINATIONALS 229, 235, 248-51
(Susumu Takamiya & Keith Thurley eds., 1985).
168 Id.
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sidiaries must include a detailed analysis of (1) the chronological
age of the subsidiary, (2) the way in which it was acquired, (3)
the type of business in which it is engaged (which may or may
not be different than that of the parent corporation) and (4) the
degree to which the parent corporation has developed into a true
multinational.
This type of analysis seems to open the proverbial Pan-
dora's box, and is certainly not a subject open to traditional no-
tions of judicial notice. Neither members of the judiciary nor
corporate counsel have the expertise to make such an analysis.
Certainly any perceived advantage of being able to make some
generalizations about Japanese corporations would be lost in the
time and cost associated with cataloging the development of
each of the Japanese corporations which owns American
subsidiaries.
The best and most reasonable approach to analysis of the
relationship between a defendant Japanese parent corporation
and its American subsidiary for purposes of a personal jurisdic-
tion inquiry is simply to apply the criteria developed by the New
York courts for the section 301 "doing business" test and the
section 302 "transacting business" test.
The following section examines the manner in which New
York courts have actually dealt with Japanese defendant
corporations.
IV. PERSONAL JURISDICTION AS APPLIED TO JAPANESE
CORPORATIONS
The authors have selected five cases involving Japanese cor-
porate defendants and the issue of personal jurisdiction as ex-
amples of how New York courts have applied CPLR sections 301
and 302 to Japanese corporations.
A. Louis Marx & Co. v. Fuji Seiko Co.'" 9
Plaintiff, a Delaware toy distributor, sued in New York Fuji
Seiko, a Japanese toy manufacturer, and Fukunaga & Co., a Jap-
anese buying agent.17 0 Fukunaga & Co. represented plaintiff,
"' 453 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
..0 Id. at 387. The plaintiff also sued Manji Fukunaga, the principal officer of
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Louis Marx & Co. (Marx), as well as Marx's competitor, Buddy
L Corp. (Buddy L), in their dealings with Japanese manufactur-
ers.171 Plaintiff Marx, a purchaser of toy typewriters, alleged
breach of contract, unfair competition, and tortious interference
with contract against' Fuji Seiko, the manufacturer of the toy
typewriters, and Fukunaga & Co., the agent through whom Marx
had purchased Fuji Seiko's typewriters. ' 7 The suit stemmed
from Fukunaga & Co.'s sale of Fuji Seiko's typewriters to Buddy
L, Marx's competitor.17 1
The court found that Fukunaga & Co. was subject to juris-
diction in New York under section 302." 1 The president of
Buddy L had traveled to Japan to meet Manji Fukunaga
(Fukunaga) the principal officer of Fukunaga & Co.' 7 Thereaf-
ter, in a period of nineteen months, Fukunaga & Co. made four
visits to New York.' 76 The first visit was to participate in an an-
nual trade show or toy fair, where the plaintiff's representative
discussed various topics with Fukunaga, including Fuji's sale of
typewriters to Buddy L.' 77 The second visit involved a meeting
in Connecticut between Fukunaga and plaintiff, to arrange sales
to Marx. It also allegedly involved another meeting at the same
time in New York between Fukunaga and Buddy L.'7 The third
visit to New York by Fukunaga was for a deposition in a com-
panion lawsuit brought by plaintiff against Buddy L "and, ap-
parently, for the toy show.' 79 The fourth visit to New York was
announced to the plaintiff by a phone call made by Fukunaga to
the plaintiff from Buddy L's office in New York, during which
sales of Fuji Seiko's toys to the plaintiff were again discussed.' 80
On the basis of these four visits to New York by Fukunaga,
Fukunaga & Co. in the same action. Id. However the court held that it did not have
jurisdiction over him personally, because he was acting on corporate business as an of-
ficer of the corporation, not in his personal capacity. Id. at 389.
171 Id. at 388-89.
17, Id. at 387.
171 Id. at 388.
,71 Id. at 389.
171 Id. at 388.
171 Id. at 388-89.
,77 Id. at 388.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 389; see also, Louis Marx & Co. v. Buddy L Corp., 453 F. Supp. 392
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
So 453 F. Supp. 385, 388-89.
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the court found that Fukunaga & Co. had transacted business in
New York.181 The court's rationale was based upon the transac-
tion of business between Buddy L and Fukunaga & Co. during
Fukunaga's visits to New York, and not on any transactions be-
tween Fukunaga and the plaintiff."" Ordinarily, such contacts
would not confer jurisdiction over Fukunaga & Co. with respect
to plaintiff. However, the cause of action asserted by Marx re-
sulted from the business relationship between Fukunaga & Co.
and Buddy L and thus the requirements of section 302 were
found to be satisfied. 18 3
This case appears to apply strictly the CPLR sections 301
and 302 tests developed in the New York case law. With respect
to defendant Fukunaga & Co., the visits to New York by its
managing agent were viewed as highly significant to the court,
since it was through these visits that the business relationship
between Fukunaga & Co. and Buddy L developed.1 84 This con-
stituted "substantial preliminary negotiations through high level
personnel 1 8 5 and "meetings . . . for purposes essential to the
formation or continuance of the contract which has given rise to
the litigation. '1 86
With regard to defendant Fuji Seiko, the court refused to
exert personal jurisdiction because Fuji Seiko had no contacts
with New York other than through Fukunaga as its buying
agent.8  The plaintiff then seized upon the theory that
'81 Id. at 389.
182 Id.
183 In passing upon the question of whether Fukanaga's activities within New York
reflect a sufficient transaction of business upon which to subject it to the court's jurisdic-
tion, the court stated that because "the development of this business relationship, which
resulted in substantial sales of merchandise, [gave] rise to some of Marx's claims, there is
jurisdiction over Fukanaga & Co." Id.
18 Id. at 388-89.
188 Longines-Wittnauer Co. v. Barnes Reinecke, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 457, 209 N.E.2d 68,
75, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 19 (1965).
188 Pneuma-Flo Systems, Inc. v. Universal Machinery, 454 F. Supp. at 866 (S.D.N.Y.
1978).
I8 Louis Marx & Co. 453 F.Supp. at 389-90. Defendant Fuji was neither incorpo-
rated in New York, nor had its principle place of business there. Id. Defendant did not
conduct promotion or advertising in New York. Id. In addition, all manufacturing took
place in Japan, and all the products were shipped FOB Japan. Id. at 389. All buyers were
responsible for making their own arrangements in shipping the products from Japan to
the United States. Id. Finally, all purchase orders were issued and all payments were
made to Fukunaga & Co., Ltd. Id.
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Fukunaga acted on behalf of Fuji as an agent.'88 The section 301
agency theory failed because (1) the agent did not do all of the
activities that the defendant would do if it were in the state it-
self, and (2) the agent had no power to bind the principal. 189
2. Bulova Watch Company, Inc. v. K. Hattori & Co., Ltd.190
Plaintiff, a domestic watch company, sued Hattori, a watch
company located in Tokyo that had no offices or personnel in
New York. Hattori did, however, fully own an American subsidi-
ary, Seiko Corporation of America, which in turn owned all the
stock in three New York corporations, Pulsar Time, Inc., Seiko
Time Corp., and SPD Precision, Inc., (collectively the Seiko
Subsidiaries) which competed directly with plaintiff.'9 ' The
Seiko Subsidiaries sold watches manufactured by Hattori and
exported to the United States.'92
Plaintiff's suit alleged that Hattori, through an officer
named Hideaki Moriya, who was simultaneously a director of
the Seiko Subsidiaries, had attempted to establish a distribution
network in America by hiring away key sales personnel from
plaintiff.' Although Hattori itself had absolutely no contacts
with New York, Judge Weinstein found that it dominated the
Seiko Subsidiaries so completely that it was subject to New
York jurisdiction, since its subsidiaries did all the business it
could do were it here by its own officers. 9 En route to its deci-
sion, the court formulated two vivid analogies to describe the
intimate relationship between the Tokyo-based defendant, Hat-
tori, and its New York subsidiaries:
I88 Id. at 390.
189 The court's rationale apparently rests upon these two reasons because the court
points to the fact that neither Fuji nor Fukunaga maintains offices, owns property, em-
ploys individuals, or advertises in New York. Id. at 388. The court also points to the fact
that Fukunaga was a buying agent for different purchasers and dealt with various manu-
facturers. Id. at 391. Thus, Fuji did not control Fukunaga. Furthermore, Fuji was not
even aware of Fukunaga's four trips to New York, and therefore the trips were not un-
dertaken with Fuji's knowledge and consent. Id.
1o 508 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
1:1 Id.
132 Id.
19' Id. at 1330-31.
19 Id. at 1344-45.
19921
27
PACE Y.B. INT'L L.
Hattori and its American subsidiaries do maintain some in-
dependence-about as much as the egg and vegetables in a west-
ern omelette.
* * , Large and sophisticated as it may be, it [Hattori] is very
much the hub of a wheel with many spokes. It is appropriate,
therefore, to look to the center of the wheel in Japan when the
spokes [i.e., the Seiko Subsidiaries] violate substantive rights in
other countries.0 5
The first noteworthy aspect of this case is the court's use of
both sections 301 and 302 simultaneously. Judge Weinstein an-
nounced the following rule:
.. .[w]hile not within the strict limit of the 302 long arm provi-
sion, the parent's actions might be sufficiently within the CPLR's
penumbra so that the combination of 301 and 302 read together
covers the particular claims asserted and long arm jurisdiction
lies. None of this would violate any constitutional requirement.""
The court's statement implies that a section 302 action
predicated on the activities of a parent corporation which would
fail for insufficient contacts directly related to the transaction,
might succeed if other section 301 "doing business" contacts on
the part of the parent corporation existed. This is an important
concept for Japanese and other foreign corporations to consider
as they order their affairs in New York. It would, for example,
suggest that Japanese companies should scrupulously avoid es-
tablishing any, even casual, continual contacts with New York
(such as maintenance of a bank account or a telephone number),
because such activities could conceivably be construed as indicia
of "doing business."
Another remarkable aspect of the Hattori case is Judge
Weinstein's liberal use of judicial notice. 197 The case is replete
'9' Id. at 1341.
190 Id. at 1327.
", Id. at 1327-29. Judicial notice is defined as:
[t]he act by which a court ... will ... recognize the existence and truth of cer-
tain facts, having a bearing on the controversy at bar, which, from their nature,
are not properly the subject of testimony, or which are universally regarded as
established by common notoriety, e.g., the laws of the state, international law,
historical events, the constitution and course of nature, main geographical fea-
tures, etc.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 848 (6th ed. 1990).
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with citations from texts describing Japanese business practices,
Japanese society, and Japanese multinational corporations.
These citations, when added to language in the opinion, which is
at best editorial and at worst bigoted, seriously undermine the
court's reasoning. This case may very well exemplify American
public opinion of Japanese corporations and the perceived
threat of Japanese financial power.
An example of the quasi-editorial language found in the
Bulova opinion is as follows:
To any layman it would seem absurd that our courts could
not obtain jurisdiction over a billion dollar multinational which is
exploiting the critical New York and American markets to keep
its home production going at a huge volume and profit. This per-
ception must have a bearing on our evaluation of fairness. The
law ignores the common sense of a situation at the peril of be-
coming irrelevant as an institution.'98
This language appears to evince a threshold bias toward the for-
eign defendant. Moreover, the suggestion that a layman's per-
ception should be included in the court's analysis has no legal
basis.
The court's emphasis on seemingly irrelevant facts further
demonstrates its apparent bias towards the defendant. Judge
Weinstein found that "[i]n 1980 over four million Hattori time-
pieces were sold in this country at prices to the consumer of one
hundred twenty five dollars and higher-far more than half a
billion dollars at retail."' 99 While the volume of business done by
the defendant within the forum state of New York is relevant, in
this case, sales outside the state with no connection to New York
would have no bearing on personal jurisdiction in New York. °°
'o Id. at 1327.
ig Id. at 1329.
200 Althought the extent to which a corporation conducts interstate or international
business is relevant to CPLR § 302(a) (3)(ii), plaintiff did not seek to claim jurisdiction
pursuant to that section, because it was not applicable. Under § 302(a)(3)(ii) plaintiff
must show that a tortious act was committted without the state causing injury within the
state, plus it must be shown that the defendant "expect[ed] or should reasonably [have]
expect[ed] the act to have consequences in the state and derive[d] substantial revenue
from interstate or international commerce." N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 302(a)(3)(ii) (Mc-
Kinney 1990). American Eutectic Welding Alloys Sales Co. v. Dytron Alloys Corp., 439
F.2d 428, 433 (2d. Cir. 1971); Chemical Bank v. World Hockey Ass'n, 403 F. Supp. 1374,
1379-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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The retail price of Hattori timepieces is mentioned almost by
way of complaint.
The most astonishing argument advanced by the court,
however, involves a view of Japanese society derived from texts
such as JAPAN AS NUMBER ONE,2 0 1 and JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES. 0 2 These and other related texts are cited repeat-
edly as sources of factual information about the Japanese. 03
The court's view of Japanese society, which is then superim-
posed over the court's jurisdictional analysis, suffers from over-
broad generalizations. The court stated that "[iln Japan subsidi-
aries are commonly referred to as ko-gaisha (child company) in
relation to oya-gaisha (parent). ' 20 4 The court accepted as dogma
the notion of a "widely-noted hierarchical structure that joins
the Japanese subsidiary to its parent, and the Japanese em-
ployee to his or her employer. s20
The court attempted to validate its sweeping cultural gener-
alizations by making broad references to the above texts. 0 Yet,
the court was far from clear as to why the Japanese culture is
singled out as a factor in its jurisdictional analysis. Are German
and French multinationals to undergo the same test? While the
court claimed to reject any simplistic test of whether a foreign
corporation does business in New York,20 7 the court's approach
raises the question whether a sterotypical view of a Japanese
Corporation can be used, to some extent, as a substitute for a
careful application of the law to particular facts at hand.
The examination of the actual control exerted by a parent
corporation over a domestic subsidiary has been the traditional
201 EZRA F. VOGEL, JAPAN As NUMBER ONE 134-36 (1979).
202 M. YOSHINO, JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 169 (1976).
203 Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1323, 1336-39 (1981).
204 Id. at 1339 (quoting KANJI HAITANI, THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC SYSTEM: AN INSTI-
TUTIONAL OVERVIEW 126 (1976)).
205 Id.
206 Id. For example, the court includes parenthetical information when citing one
text, pointing out the "tendency of [a] parent to impose its will on [a] subsidiary because
of [the] strong Japanese sense of hierarchy." Id. (citing YOSHINO, supra note 201, at 169).
The court goes on to state that "[tihe sense of hierarchy is apparently to be found in
typical employee-employer relations as well. An inferior in Japanese social organization
is 'conditioned to attribute authority to the wishes of his superior .... (ellipses in origi-
nal) the subordinate is extremely conscious of his standing in the group.'" Id. (quoting
Haitani, supra note 204, at 92 (1976)).
20 Id. at 1335.
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focus of analysis of New York courts. 2 ' The view suggested by
the Bulova court (which apparently is to be applied solely in
cases involving Japanese companies) creates a presumption of
control, which in turn would violate the burden of proof stan-
dard in personal jurisdiction as exists in New York, by shifting
the burden to the defendant to show a lack of parental
control. 09
Actions and negotiations by high level personnel of defend-
ant foreign corporations are valid factors in a section 302 mini-
mum contacts analysis. 10 But Judge Weinstein's analysis again
creates a presumption that a former employee of a parent corpo-
ration, now employed by its domestic subsidiary, is an agent of
the parent and is acting for and on behalf of the parent. "Under
the shukko system, an employee may be assigned to another em-
ployer or to a subsidiary. While on external assignment the em-
ployee keeps his 'security in, and identity with' his original em-
ployer. '211  The interchanging or transferring of employees
between subsidiaries is, of course, an important criteria under
the section 301 "doing business through subsidiaries" test as for-
mulated in New York case law, but to assume that all Japanese
employees thus transferred retain allegiance to the transferor
corporation is another broad generalization not appropriate for
judicial notice. As noted above, the sharing of officers and direc-
tors does not by itself establish the control necessary for per-
sonal jurisdiction based upon activities of subsidiaries. 212
08 See, e.g., Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk AG of Wolfsburg, 29 N.Y.2d 426, 432, 278
N.E.2d 895, 897, 328 N.Y.S.2d 653, 657 (1972); Titu-Serban Ionescu v. E.F. Hutton &
Co., 434 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 636 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir. 1980); Freeman v.
Gordon & Breach, Science Publishers, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 519, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Tokyo
Boeki (U.S.A.), Inc. v. SS Navarino, 324 F. Supp. 361, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
20, The burden is on the plaintiff to establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant. Hoffritz For Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac,
Ltd. 763 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1985). See also Marine Midland Bank v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899,
904 (2d Cir. 1981). However, until an evidentiary hearing is held, the plaintiff need only
make a prima facie showing that jurisdiction exists. Beacon Enterprises, Inc. v. Menzies,
715 F.2d 757, 768 (2d Cir. 1983).
1 0 See, e.g., Longines-Wittnauer Co. v. Barnes Reinecke, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d
75, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
... Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., Ltd., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1340 (E.D.N.Y.
1981) (citing HAITANI, supra note 204, at 46).
" See, e.g., loviero v. Ciga Hotels, Inc., 101 A.D.2d 852, 853, 475 N.Y.S.2d 880, 881
(2d Dep't 1984).
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In defense of the court's decision, it appears that the evi-
dence suggested that Hattori exercised extensive control over its
subsidiaries." 3 This, when viewed with the interchanging of per-
sonnel, identical product lines, and Moriya's status as an officer
of both Hattori and the Seiko Subsidiaries, supports jurisdiction
under a section 301 "doing business through subsidiaries" (mere
department) analysis or a section 302 "minimum contacts" (ne-
gotiations and actions in the forum by a high level employee of
the parent) analysis.
However, this court's stereotypical view of Japanese society
and of Japanese business practices is a factor that Japanese cor-
porations need to consider as they order their economic relations
with New York.
C. Arrow Trading Co., Inc. v. Sanyei Corp. (Hong Kong)
Ltd.1 4
This action was brought by Arrow Trading Company, a New
York corporation, against Sanyei Corporation (Hong Kong) Ltd.
(Sanyei Hong Kong), a Hong Kong corporation with no offices in
New York.21 8 Sanyei Hong Kong was a subsidiary of non-party
Sanyei Corporation of Japan, which also owned non-party
Sanyei New York, a New York corporation.2 16 The most signifi-
cant aspect of this case was plaintiff's attempt to assert jurisdic-
tion over Sanyei Hong Kong based on the activities of its "sis-
ter" subsidiary, Sanyei New York.2" ' Thus the effort here was
not to reach the "parent" corporation based on that parent's
control over its "child" subsidiary but to reach beyond the par-
ent to a "sister" based on the activities of the parent's other
daughter. 18
213 Virtually all of Hattori's sales in America were through the subsidiaries. Hattori,
508 F. Supp. at 1342. Hattori owned all the stock of its subsidaries. Id. at 1340. If the
New York subsidiaries needed funds, Hattori was to act as the lender, as it did with its
other subsidiaries. Id.
... 576 F. Supp. 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
"18 Id. at 68.
21o Id.
11 Id. at 70.
118 Usage of familial analogies to describe corporate structure are in accord with
Judge Weinstein's practice in Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322,
1339 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
[Vol. 4:319
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol4/iss1/12
JAPANESE CORPORATIONS
The transaction which formed the basis for the litigation
was initiated in 1978 by plaintiff Arrow's president, who trav-
elled to Hong Kong to meet and to negotiate with officials of
Sanyei Hong Kong for Arrow's purchase of flashlights. 1 9 Follow-
ing the meeting in Hong Kong, further negotiations by telex and
mail took place.120 Arrow forwarded a purchase order to Sanyei
Hong Kong, which order was confirmed by Sanyei Hong Kong in
writing.2 1 Arrow later ordered additional flashlights by telex.222
Letters of credit were opened by Arrow in favor of Sanyei Hong
Kong.223 A significant component of the parties' contract was
Sanyei Hong Kong's guarantee of delivery-but not of quality.2 2'
Thus Sanyei's role was that of a buying agent for Arrow assigned
to locate a Hong Kong manufacturer for Arrow's flashlights.
Sanyei Hong Kong's status as a mere buying agent may have
prompted the court to accord its jurisdictional defense greater
weight than this defense ordinarily would have merited.
A dispute as to quality arose and Arrow's vice president vis-
ited Hong Kong to try to resolve the problem. 2 5 Telexes were
exchanged and culminated in a visit by an officer of defendant's
sister subsidiary, Sanyei New York, to Arrow's warehouse in
New York to view the defects and report his findings to Sanyei
Hong Kong.2 6 Following this, Arrow's officers twice visited Hong
Kong and Sanyei Hong Kong's officers twice visited New York,
but the parties could not resolve their disagreements.
2 27
After Arrow instituted suit in New York, Sanyei Hong Kong
moved to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction.22 The
district court granted the motion, finding that Sanyei Hong
Kong was not subject to the jurisdiction of the New York courts
because Arrow had failed to establish that Sanyei Hong Kong
was either doing business or transacting business in New
"9 576 F. Supp. 67, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
220 Id.
221 Id.
22 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id.
22 Id. at 68.
226 Id.
.:7 Id. at 69.
28 Id. at 68.
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York.22
Under section 301 (the "doing business" analysis) the court
looked to the totality of Sanyei Hong Kong's contacts with New
York and found that "[in 1981, each of four representatives of
Sanyei Hong Kong visited New York once, for visits totalling
twenty-six days. Defendant characterizes these visits as social
visits, which were apparently intended to maintain good will be-
tween Sanyei Hong Kong and its clients across the globe. 230
An issue of fact existed as to whether Sanyei Hong Kong
had used these trips to New York to solicit business. Even if
Sanyei Hong Kong had solicited, however, the court found that
such would, under Frummer,31 constitute "mere solicitation"
and could not establish jurisdiction under New York law.23
Faced with the court's refusal to find that Sanyei Hong
Kong itself did business in New York, plaintiff argued that the
in-state activities of Sanyei New York, performed for the benefit
of defendant, Sanyei Hong Kong, the sister subsidiary, were at-
tributable to defendant and constituted doing business. 233 The
court rejected this argument, finding that the services performed
by Sanyei New York, such as booking reservations, relaying in-
formation and transmitting samples, were ministerial and "few
if any can be said to require the use of discretion or [an] exercise
of judgment."'2 3' The court also noted that Sanyei New York was
paid for rendering these services. 3 Classifying Sanyei New
York's functions as "ministerial", the court applied the Frum-
mer test (does the New York agent do all the business which
defendant could do were it here by its own officials?), 36 and
concluded that Sanyei Hong Kong was not doing business based
on Sanyei New York's in-state activities.3
For its "transaction of business" analysis under section 302,
the court focused on the two visits to New York by the defend-
229 Id. at 71.
230 Id. at 69.
231 19 N.Y.2d 533, 536, 227 N.E.2d 851, 853, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, 43 (1967).
23 Arrow Trading Co., Inc. v. Sanyei Corp. (Hong Kong) Ltd., 576 F. Supp. 67, 69
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
23 Id. at 70.
234 Id.
235 Id.
23 19 N.Y.2d 533, 537, 227 N.E.2d 851, 854, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, 44.
" Arrow Trading Co., Inc., 576 F. Supp. at 70.
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ant's vice president to inspect the defective goods and to settle
the dispute.238 In its analysis of these contacts, the court could
find no act on the part of the defendant by which it purposefully
availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum state.23 9
Plaintiff's claim arose out of its dissatisfaction with the
shipment of flashlights it received. The transaction, the sale of
flashlights, had already been completed, when defendant on two
occasions visited New York.240 The court noted that it was plain-
tiff who initiated the underlying agreement between the parties,
that negotiations were conducted by mail and telex, and that de-
fendant's performance was to take place in Hong Kong.2"1 Con-
sequently, these two visits to New York by defendant were held
to fall short of the threshold of "minimum contacts" and did not
constitute "transacting business" in New York.242
Arrow sets forth several important rules that foreign corpo-
rations seeking to avoid New York jurisdiction should follow
when dealing with New York corporations. First, foreign corpo-
rations should solicit and negotiate agreements in their foreign
locales or by mail and telex, and should not send their officials
to New York until after consummation of contracts. Second, a
foreign corporation should, if possible, assume the role of "buy-
ing agent" for a New York purchaser, so that ultimate responsi-
bility and jurisdictional consequences attach to the manufac-
turer rather than to the intermediate buying agent. Finally, if a
foreign corporation seeks to use the services of an agent or affili-
ate located in New York, it should delegate only ministerial du-
ties, and not any discretionary powers, to that affiliate and
should pay the affiliate for its services.
:38 Id. at 70.
39 Id.
,0 Id. at 68.
" Id. at 70-71.
12 Id. at 71.
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D. Bon Jour International, Ltd. v. Nissho Iwai Hong Kong
Corporation, Ltd.243
In this unreported decision, which is almost squarely on
point with the facts in Arrow, and in which the authors of this
article represented defendant, the trial court sustained defend-
ant's affirmative defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. " De-
fendant Nissho Iwai Hong Kong ("NIHK"), like Sanyei Hong
Kong in the Arrow case, was the Hong Kong subsidiary of a Jap-
anese trading company, was incorporated in Hong Kong, and
had no offices or personnel in New York state.24 5
NIHK and plaintiff had negotiated and executed contracts
in Hong Kong for the sale of garments from defendant to plain-
tiff.24 Plaintiff was a New York apparel company, whose high
level personnel (president and vice president) had travelled to
Hong Kong to consummate these transactions.247 When delivery
difficulties later arose, the parties communicated not only by
telex, but NIHK on one occasion enlisted the aid of its New
York sister subsidiary, Nissho Iwai America Corporation, to ex-
plain more fully to plaintiff the specifics of the delivery difficul-
ties.248 Plaintiff sued in New York alleging that NIHK's single
use of its New York sister subsidiary to help remedy the delivery
problems constituted either doing business under section 301 or
transacting business under section 302.249 Sharp issues of fact
also existed because plaintiff claimed that the contracts were ne-
gotiated and signed in New York while defendant maintained
that negotiation and execution occurred in Hong Kong.150 Rec-
ommending dismissal of the complaint on jurisdictional grounds,
the special referee assigned to conduct a hearing on the jurisdic-
tional issue found:
[t]he facts in this case are directly analogous to those in Ar-
row .... I find that there is no credible evidence of negotiation
or signing of a contract in New York, nor were goods to be sup-
24 No. 87-7450, slip op. (N.Y. July, 1990).
244 Id. at 4.
241 Id. at 1.
246 Id.
"' No. 87-07450, slip op. at 1 (N.Y. July, 1990).
248 Id. at 2-3.
242 Id. at 2, 3.
2 Id. at 3.
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plied in New York. As in Arrow, the only contact with New York
was the plaintiff's place of business.2 '
The trial court followed the referee's recommendation and dis-
missed the complaint.2 52
Several important jurisdictional lessons can be learned from
Bon Jour. The various local subsidiaries of Nissho Iwai wisely
maintained strict independence from each other and did not
freely assist each other in transactions, which assistance might
have created an inference of agency. Additionally, the contracts
at issue were negotiated and executed outside of New York and
all subsequent communications regarding them were also done
outside New York via telex. Finally, NIHK, unlike plaintiff, kept
excellent records of all its transactions and these records, com-
bined with the willingness of NIHK's personnel to come to the
United States and testify about the transaction, made NIHK's
jurisdictional defense successful.
E. Lemme v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc. and Konishi Brewing
Co. 253
Plaintiff, a New York wine distributor, brought a breach of
contract action against Wine of Japan Import, Inc. (Wine of Ja-
pan), a New York importer, and Konishi Brewing Company, a
Japanese distiller and the guarantor of the contract.25 ' Konishi's
guarantee was unusually comprehensive in that it guaranteed
not merely delivery but all "obligations, representations and
warranties" of Wine of Japan.255
Although Konishi was incorporated in Japan and had no of-
fice or personnel in New York, it did own twenty-seven percent
of Wine of Japan's stock.256 Defendant Konishi moved to dis-
miss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that
it neither transacted nor did business in New York.257 The court
51 Id. at 4.
Bon Jour Int'l, Ltd. v. Nissho Iwai Hong Kong Corp., No. 87-07450 (N.Y. July,
1990) (order directing dismissal of complaint).
:53 631 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
'I Id. at 458.
266 Id. at 461.
256 Id. at 458-59.
C57 Id. at 458. Defendant's lack of personal jurisdiction motion was made under FED.
R. Cv. P. 12 (b)(2). The defendant also based its motion to dismiss on insufficiency of
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agreed with Konishi, but nonetheless found that Konishi was
subject to New York's jurisdiction based on Konishi's execution
of the unusually comprehensive guarantee.26 8
Under its section 302 analysis, the court found that Konishi
was not transacting business in New York.259 Plaintiff claimed
that Konishi "contract[ed] . . . to supply goods or services in
the state" under section 302(a)(1).260 However, since Wine of Ja-
pan was to perform the contract in Japan, the court summarily
dismissed this argument.261
In its section 301 analysis the court focused on plaintiff's
claim that Konishi was doing business through the in-state ac-
tivity of its alleged agent and co-defendant, Wine of Japan. Re-
lying on the Southern District of New York's decision in Louis
Marx & Co. v. Fuji Seiko Co.,2 62 the court held that Konishi's
owning twenty-seven percent of Wine of Japan's stock, absent
any evidence of control by Konishi over Wine of Japan, was in
itself insufficient to establish agency.263
The court flatly rejected plaintiff's "startling" assertion that
by the very act of guaranteeing Wine of Japan's obligations
Konishi automatically established a principal-agent relationship
with Wine of Japan.2"" This court's refusal to find an agency re-
lationship absent an affirmative showing of control should be
contrasted with the Hattori26 court's rigid rule that in the cor-
porate world of Japan, all parents control their subsidiaries.
However, rather than dismissing the complaint after it had
found that Konishi neither did nor transacted business in New
York, the court went beyond the traditional statutory jurisdic-
tional analysis and held Konishi subject to the jurisdiction of
New York.266 The contract between plaintiff and defendant
process and insufficient service of process under FED. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(4),(5). However,
the issues related to service of process are beyond the scope of this .article and therefore
will not be addressed.
25 Id. at 461.
I d. at 459.
160 Id.
261 Id.
22 453 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
163 Lemme, 631 F. Supp. 459-60.
284 Id. at 460.
'e' 508 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
25 Lemme. 631 F.Supp. at 461.
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Wine of Japan had a provision by which the parties consented to
personal jurisdiction in New York. Seizing on this clause, the
court held: "Konishi undertook to guarantee more than simply
the delivery of the products ordered by the plaintiff; it adopted
as its own each and every term and condition of the Agreement.
This emphatic expression of intent to assume every obligation
under the contract necessarily included the consent-to-jurisdic-
tion clause. 261 7 Hence, the court reasoned that under these cir-
cumstances, "Konishi could reasonably anticipate being [haled]
into court [in New York]. 2 68
The most noteworthy learning from Lemme is that foreign
corporations should exercise caution when executing guarantees
of contracts that contain consent-to-jurisdiction clauses. If a
comprehensive guarantee is given, it should expressly exempt a
consent-to-jurisdiction clause in the guaranteed contract.
CONCLUSION
Japanese corporations who have business contacts in New
York and American corporations who deal with Japanese clients
can anticipate that the personal jurisdiction requirements as
codified in CPLR sections 301 and 302 will be applied to Japa-
nese corporations as they would be applied to other foreign cor-
porations. There is however the possibility, based on cases such
as Bulova, that a Japanese corporation will be viewed in light of
prevalent notions of Japanese business practices.
Management should be aware of what actions will constitute
doing business, and what actions will constitute transacting bus-
iness within the state, and accordingly order their relationships
7 Id. In rejecting Konishi's argument, the court distinguished two cases where for-
eign corporations who acted as guarantors to contracts that included consent to jurisdic-
tion clauses, were held not to have consented to jurisdiction merely by virtue of the
clauses themselves. Id. The court pointed out that in Pal Pools, Inc. v. Billiot Bros., Inc.,
57 A.D.2d 891, 394 N.Y.S.2d 280 (2d Dep't 1977), .the guarantee agreement expressly
included a choice of law provision and yet lacked a consent to jurisdiction clause and
thereby indicated an intent not to be subject to New York jurisdiction. Lemme, 631
F.Supp. at 461. The court distinguished General Electric Credit Corp. v. Toups, 644 F.
Supp. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), by pointing out that the inclusion of certain provisions of the
contract in the guaranty agreement and the omission of others, specifically the consent
to jurisdiction clause, indicated that the parties did not intend to be subject to New
York jurisdiction. Lemme, 631 F. Supp. at 461.
"" Id. (citing Worldwide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
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with domestic clients. For example, in order to avoid "doing
business" in New York, Japanese companies should if possible
not maintain any offices, personnel or bank accounts in New
York. Transactions with New York corporations should be nego-
tiated in Japan or by mail and telex. If the Japanese corporation
has a subsidiary located in New York, it should not use that
subsidiary for any but ministerial tasks and should pay the sub-
sidiary for services performed. In addition, parent and subsidiar-
ies must be truly independent and should not share common
employees or corporate records.
Japanese parent corporations can attempt to avoid "trans-
acting business" in New York by, among other things, negotiat-
ing and signing all contracts outside of New York and by not
sending to New York any "high-level" corporate personnel to
negotiate or promote transactions with New York companies.
Finally, Japanese companies can also insist on the inclusion
in contracts of arbitration, choice of forum,26 9 and choice of law
provisions. Through such provisions, by selecting sites and
methods of dispute resolution, Japanese companies can elimi-
nate the need for courts to intervene.
269 See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S.Ct. 1522, 113 L.Ed.2d 622 (1991)
(a recent view of forum selection clauses in transnational contracts).
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